Carter and 1979: The Untold Story of U.S. Diplomacy and Israel's Military Attaché in Iran...

The passing of President Jimmy Carter has reopened a chapter of history that remains divisive and deeply consequential: the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the rise of the Islamic Revolution. While Carter is remembered for his successes, particularly the Camp David Accords, his handling of Iran remains one of the most controversial aspects of his presidency. For Yitzhak Segev, Israel's military attaché in Iran during this turbulent period, Carter's policies played a critical role in the disastrous outcome that led to the Islamic Republic and the Ayatollahs’ rise to power. In his view, Carter's idealism about democracy led him to miscalculate the situation, thus inadvertently opening the door for Khomeini's revolutionary forces to seize control.

Segev, who served as Israel’s military attaché in Tehran from 1977 until the Shah's fall in 1979, has provided a rare insider perspective on the events leading up to the Islamic Revolution. His testimony reveals that U.S. diplomacy, led by Carter, failed to grasp the complexity of the Iranian political landscape. While Carter’s administration pushed for the Shah’s ouster, it did so without a clear understanding of what would replace him. In Segev’s view, Carter’s missteps laid the groundwork for the collapse of a pro-Western monarchy and the installation of a regime that would become a central adversary in U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.

The Moment of Reckoning

As an elite officer in the Israeli military, Segev had a front-row seat to the drama unfolding in Iran. He spoke candidly about his interactions with Carter, American, Iranian, and Israeli officials, offering firsthand accounts of the atmosphere in Tehran leading up to the 1979 revolution. In his assessment, Carter's treatment of Iran was a fundamental mistake.

“Carter did all he could to push the Shah out without thinking about who would replace him,” Segev told journalists shortly after the death of the former president. He is quick to add that he is not defending the Shah's regime or his notorious intelligence service, SAVAK. Instead, Segev argues that the U.S. administration's lack of a contingency plan for the post-Shah era ultimately paved the way for the ascension of the Ayatollahs, a development that Washington failed to predict or prepare for.

Segev’s criticism hinges on the belief that Carter, driven by his strong commitment to human rights, failed to appreciate the dangerous power vacuum that would emerge once the Shah was gone. Carter, in his idealism, believed the Iranian people would embrace democracy once the autocratic monarchy was dismantled. Unfortunately, history would prove this hope tragically misplaced.

The Missed Opportunity for Cooperation

A key part of Segev's analysis involves the missed opportunities for cooperation between Israel and the U.S. in dealing with Iran's unrest. In 1978, as demonstrations against the Shah escalated across Iran, the Israeli government made an offer to assist Tehran in quelling the uprising. Israel, with its extensive intelligence network and military capabilities, was in a position to provide support to the embattled monarchy. Segev recounts a telling moment when he and Moshe Dayan, Israel’s then defense minister, met with Nematollah Nassiri, the head of SAVAK.

"We came here to offer you any help from Israel," Dayan told Nassiri during a meeting in which the Israeli officials hoped to discuss how Israel could assist in containing the political instability. But Nassiri’s response was dismissive. "Don’t worry, everything is under control," he replied. Despite the growing anti-Shah sentiment, the head of Iran’s intelligence apparatus insisted that the situation was manageable. Segev recalls leaving the meeting with a sense of disappointment, as it became clear that Iran’s leadership was unwilling to accept help, even from a close ally.

The failure to act decisively in the months leading up to the revolution would prove costly. With the Iranian government unwilling to confront the growing opposition, and the U.S. hesitant to intervene on the side of the Shah, the revolutionary forces, led by the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, were left to fill the power vacuum. In Segev’s view, this was not a moment of missed diplomacy—it was a turning point that could have altered the course of history.

The Secret Dialogue and Khomeini’s Deceptive Assurance

One of the most startling aspects of Segev’s account concerns the U.S. administration's belief that Khomeini might be a stable ally in the Cold War context. Carter and his advisors were deeply concerned about the rise of communism in the region, particularly in Iran’s neighboring countries. According to Segev, Carter believed that Khomeini, as an anti-communist figure, could be trusted to preserve American interests in the region.

The U.S. administration engaged in secret communications with Khomeini while he was in exile in Paris. According to declassified documents, Khomeini reassured the Americans that he would restore stability and that Iranian-American relations would not be harmed. At the time, the U.S. was desperate to stabilize the situation in Iran and prevent the country from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. Khomeini, however, had no intention of fulfilling these promises. His ultimate goal was the establishment of an Islamic theocracy, which would be in direct opposition to American influence and interests.

In a startling conversation, Segev recounts how, just before Khomeini’s return to Iran, Carter had called the leaders of France and Germany to assure them that Khomeini was not a communist. “Don’t worry, I checked about Khomeini, and he is not communist,” Carter reportedly said. The naivety of this assumption, in Segev’s view, was a critical misjudgment—one that would have profound implications for the United States and the Middle East for decades to come.

The U.S. Government’s Divided Response

Internally, the U.S. government was deeply divided on how to handle the Iranian crisis. According to both Segev and U.S. envoy General Robert Huyser’s memoir, there were conflicting approaches within the Carter administration regarding the Iranian military. While Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor, advocated for a military coup to restore order and protect American interests, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opposed such drastic action. This division left the U.S. without a coherent strategy during a critical period of the revolution.

As events spiraled out of control, it became clear that Iran’s military, once the cornerstone of the Shah’s rule, was fractured and unable to maintain order. Many Iranian generals were secretly planning to defect or join the opposition. In the end, the revolution was not quashed by a military coup, but rather by the rise of a revolutionary movement led by Khomeini and supported by a coalition of various political factions, from secular nationalists to radical clerics.

The Regrets of 1979: A Conversation with Vance and Carter

In the years following the revolution, Segev met with both Carter and Vance during a peace conference. Curious about their reflections on U.S. policy in Iran, Segev directly asked Vance if he had any regrets. Vance's answer was one of deep remorse. "It was a big mistake," he admitted, acknowledging the failure of U.S. policy in the face of Iran's revolutionary forces.

When Segev posed the same question to Carter, however, the response was less forthcoming. According to Segev, Carter did not express any regret for his administration's handling of Iran. While Carter’s legacy as a human rights advocate and peacemaker remains largely intact, his administration’s failure to anticipate the consequences of the Shah’s fall and to properly assess Khomeini’s intentions represents a significant blind spot in his presidency.

A Legacy of Unanswered Questions

As the world reflects on Carter’s life and legacy, the events of 1979 remain a haunting reminder of the complexities of international diplomacy. Carter’s belief in the promotion of democracy, while admirable, ultimately overlooked the stark realities of the Iranian political landscape. The fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini set the stage for decades of instability and conflict in the Middle East. For Yitzhak Segev, the U.S. president’s idealism, combined with a lack of foresight, helped pave the way for the Islamic Revolution—a revolution that, to this day, continues to shape the geopolitics of the region.

As history judges Carter’s presidency, the untold story of Israel’s military attaché in Iran offers a unique perspective—one that highlights the intersection of diplomacy, idealism, and the harsh realities of political power in a volatile region. Segev’s insights may not provide definitive answers, but they offer valuable lessons for future policymakers grappling with the complexities of international relations.